# Configuring IPsec | Cycle.io

Canonical URL: https://cycle.io/learn/configuring-ipsec

## Configuring IPsec.

IPsec (Internet Protocol Security) encrypts and authenticates traffic at the IP layer, before a packet leaves the machine. Because IPsec works below TCP and UDP, applications don't need to know it's there. A database replica, a message queue and an internal API all get the same protection, because the kernel encrypts the packets instead of each app bringing its own TLS.

That makes IPsec the standard answer to one specific problem: servers that talk to each other over the public internet. The usual cases are VMs in two different clouds, a bare metal server in a colo talking to a node in AWS, or a cluster that spans regions with no private link between them. Without encryption at the network layer, each of those connections is either plaintext on the wire or relying on every application to get TLS right.

### IPsec by default on Cycle

Hand-built IPsec works for a pair of servers. It can get more expensive as the fleet grows, because every pair of hosts needs its own tunnel, credentials and firewall rules.

If that's not something you want to manage yourself, Cycle handles it in the control plane. When a server joins a cluster, Cycle maps the network paths to its neighbors. Nodes with a private link use it. Nodes without one get an IPsec-encrypted link over the public internet, with keys generated and rotated by Cycle. When a private link appears later, the route upgrades automatically.

The result is one flat, encrypted network across AWS, GCP, bare metal and anything else in the cluster, with no tunnel configs to write.

If you run your own servers, or want to understand what the control plane is doing for you, the rest of this page walks through configuring IPsec by hand.

### What is IPsec?

IPsec (Internet Protocol Security) is a suite of IETF protocols that authenticates and encrypts traffic at the IP layer. Two hosts or gateways use IKEv2 to authenticate each other and agree on keys, then protect every IP packet between them with ESP. Applications and transport protocols above IP need no changes.

#### How IPsec works

Three pieces do most of the work. A fourth, AH, is part of the standard but rarely deployed:

| Component | What it does | On the wire |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **IKEv2** (Internet Key Exchange) | Authenticates the peers, agrees on algorithms and derives keys | UDP 500, or UDP 4500 when NAT is in the path |
| **Security Associations (SAs)** | The agreements IKE produces. The IKE SA protects the negotiation channel. CHILD SAs carry the actual traffic. Both expire and rekey on a timer. | Kernel state, not packets |
| **ESP** (Encapsulating Security Payload) | Encrypts and authenticates each packet using the CHILD SA's keys | IP protocol 50, or wrapped in UDP 4500 behind NAT |
| **AH** (Authentication Header) | Authenticates each packet, including most of the outer IP header, without encrypting it | IP protocol 51 |

IKE runs in userspace (strongSwan's `charon` daemon on Linux). ESP runs in the kernel. Once IKE installs the SAs, the daemon is out of the data path.

The SAs that carry traffic are one-way, so they come in pairs, one inbound and one outbound. Every ESP packet carries the Security Parameter Index (SPI) of the SA it belongs to, which is how the receiving kernel finds the keys.

RFC 4301 makes ESP mandatory and AH optional, since ESP already provides integrity. AH also authenticates the outer IP addresses, so a NAT on the path breaks it, and NAT traversal (RFC 3948) covers ESP only. Use ESP unless a peer requires AH.

#### IPsec ports and protocols

A firewall between two IPsec peers has to pass these:

| Allow | Carries | When it's needed | Defined in |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| UDP 500 | IKEv2 | Always. IKE negotiations normally start here. | RFC 7296 |
| UDP 4500 | IKEv2 and UDP-encapsulated ESP | When NAT is detected between the peers, when `encap = yes` forces it, or when strongSwan moves IKE there for MOBIKE | RFC 7296, RFC 3948 |
| IP protocol 50 | ESP | Encrypted traffic when there is no NAT in the path | RFC 4303 |
| IP protocol 51 | AH  | Only if a peer is configured to use AH | RFC 4302 |

ESP and AH are IP protocols in their own right, like TCP and UDP, and have no port numbers. A rule that allows "port 50" opens a TCP or UDP port and leaves ESP blocked. Match the protocol instead: `meta l4proto esp` in nftables, or `-p esp` in iptables. Step 2 below has the nftables rules for this page's setup.

A capture of this page's setup shows the sequence. IKE starts on UDP 500 and moves to UDP 4500 (strongSwan does this for MOBIKE even without NAT), then the traffic itself is raw ESP, with one SPI per direction:

```
IP 203.0.113.10.500 > 198.51.100.20.500: isakmp: parent_sa ikev2_init[I]
IP 198.51.100.20.500 > 203.0.113.10.500: isakmp: parent_sa ikev2_init[R]
IP 203.0.113.10.4500 > 198.51.100.20.4500: NONESP-encap: isakmp: child_sa  ikev2_auth[I]
IP 198.51.100.20.4500 > 203.0.113.10.4500: NONESP-encap: isakmp: child_sa  ikev2_auth[R]
IP 203.0.113.10 > 198.51.100.20: ESP(spi=0xcf5d20f2,seq=0x1), length 100
IP 198.51.100.20 > 203.0.113.10: ESP(spi=0xcc347e5d,seq=0x1), length 100
```

#### Where IPsec is used

-   **Site-to-site VPNs.** Two gateways connect office, data center or VPC networks, so hosts on either side need no VPN client. See [site-to-site VPN](https://cycle.io/learn/site-to-site-vpn).
-   **Cloud VPN gateways.** As of November 2026, AWS Site-to-Site VPN, Azure VPN Gateway (site-to-site) and Google Cloud VPN all connect to your network over IPsec.
-   **Remote-access VPNs.** Laptops and phones connect to a gateway with an IKEv2 client. Azure VPN Gateway, for example, offers IKEv2 for point-to-site connections. [What is a VPN](https://cycle.io/learn/what-is-a-vpn) compares remote-access and site-to-site VPNs.
-   **Host-to-host encryption.** Two servers encrypt everything between them, with no gateway involved. That's the setup the rest of this page builds.

Gateways normally run tunnel mode, and hosts talking directly run transport mode. The "Transport mode vs. tunnel mode" section below covers the difference.

#### IPsec vs. WireGuard vs. TLS-based VPNs

|     | IPsec | WireGuard | TLS-based VPN (OpenVPN, SSL VPNs) |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Encrypts | IP packets, in the kernel (XFRM on Linux) | IP packets, through a `wg0`\-style interface | IP packets or Ethernet frames, in the VPN daemon |
| Key exchange | IKEv2: negotiated algorithms; PSK, certificate or EAP auth | Noise IK handshake, fixed algorithms (Curve25519, ChaCha20-Poly1305), one public key per peer | TLS handshake on a control channel, usually X.509 certificates |
| On the wire | UDP 500 and 4500, plus ESP (IP protocol 50) | One UDP port | UDP or TCP |
| Typical use | Site-to-site links, cloud VPN gateways, vendor appliances | Server-to-server tunnels, overlay networks | Remote access, including from TCP-only networks |

Pick IPsec when the other end is a cloud gateway or an appliance. WireGuard has far fewer settings, but both ends must run it; [configuring WireGuard](https://cycle.io/learn/configuring-wireguard) covers the same two-server setup. [VPN security considerations](https://cycle.io/learn/vpn-security-considerations) applies to all three.

#### Transport mode vs. tunnel mode

IPsec has two modes, the choice of which depends on who the traffic belongs to.

**Transport mode** encrypts the packet's payload and keeps the original IP header. Use it when the two IPsec endpoints are also the two hosts talking, which is the server-to-server case. It has the lowest overhead.

**Tunnel mode** wraps the entire original packet inside a new IP header. Use it when a gateway encrypts traffic on behalf of a network behind it, which is the classic site-to-site VPN.

For servers talking directly over the internet, start with transport mode. This page configures that first, then shows the change for site-to-site.

### Choosing an IPsec implementation

On Linux, the kernel does the encryption through its XFRM framework. What you choose is the IKE daemon that negotiates keys and installs the SAs. Two are actively maintained:

| Implementation | Config | Where it fits |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **strongSwan** | `swanctl.conf` | Packaged on Debian and Ubuntu, available on RHEL through EPEL |
| **Libreswan** | `ipsec.conf` and `/etc/ipsec.d/*.conf` | The IPsec implementation Red Hat supports on RHEL |

Both speak IKEv2 and interoperate with each other and with cloud VPN gateways. This page uses strongSwan. On RHEL, where you want a vendor-supported stack, use Libreswan. The concepts, ports and firewall rules are the same.

Two things to avoid when reading older guides. strongSwan's legacy interface, `ipsec.conf` driven by the `ipsec` command, has been deprecated for years and is no longer built by default as of strongSwan 6.0. That applies to strongSwan only, since `ipsec.conf` is Libreswan's current format. Openswan and ipsec-tools (racoon) are no longer maintained, so skip guides built on them.

### Before you start

The examples use two servers with public IPs:

| Host | Public IP |
| --- | --- |
| `server-a` | `203.0.113.10` |
| `server-b` | `198.51.100.20` |

You need root on both, and strongSwan 5.9 or newer configured through `swanctl`.

### Step 1: Install strongSwan

On Debian and Ubuntu:

```bash
sudo apt install charon-systemd strongswan-swanctl
```

On RHEL, Rocky and AlmaLinux, strongSwan comes from EPEL:

```bash
sudo dnf install epel-release
sudo dnf install strongswan
```

The config directory differs by distribution. Debian and Ubuntu use `/etc/swanctl/`. EPEL packages use `/etc/strongswan/swanctl/`. Adjust the paths below to match.

### Step 2: Open the firewall

Each server must accept IKE and ESP from its peer. On `server-a`, with nftables and an existing `inet filter` table:

```bash
sudo nft add rule inet filter input ip saddr 198.51.100.20 udp dport { 500, 4500 } accept
sudo nft add rule inet filter input ip saddr 198.51.100.20 meta l4proto esp accept
```

Mirror the rules on `server-b` with `203.0.113.10` as the source. If the servers sit behind cloud security groups, allow the same traffic there too. Security groups often permit UDP but silently drop ESP, which is the most common reason a tunnel negotiates but passes no traffic.

### Step 3: Generate a pre-shared key

Two servers can authenticate each other with a pre-shared key (PSK). Generate a long random one:

```bash
openssl rand -base64 48
```

Both servers use the same key. Copy it over a channel you already trust, such as SSH. PSKs are fine for a pair of hosts. Past that, use certificates.

### Step 4: Configure server-a

Create `/etc/swanctl/conf.d/server-b.conf` on `server-a`:

```
connections {
    server-b {
        version = 2
        local_addrs = 203.0.113.10
        remote_addrs = 198.51.100.20
        proposals = aes256gcm16-prfsha384-ecp384
        dpd_delay = 30s

        local {
            auth = psk
            id = 203.0.113.10
        }
        remote {
            auth = psk
            id = 198.51.100.20
        }
        children {
            server-b {
                mode = transport
                esp_proposals = aes256gcm16-ecp384
                start_action = trap
                dpd_action = trap
            }
        }
    }
}

secrets {
    ike-server-b {
        id = 198.51.100.20
        secret = "PASTE_THE_KEY_FROM_STEP_3"
    }
}
```

What the key lines do:

-   `proposals` and `esp_proposals` set the algorithms for IKE and ESP. AES-256-GCM with an ECP-384 key exchange is a solid default. Both sides must offer a matching proposal.
-   `mode = transport` keeps the original IP headers, since the servers are the endpoints.
-   No traffic selectors are set, so strongSwan defaults to the two hosts' own addresses. Every packet between `203.0.113.10` and `198.51.100.20` is encrypted.
-   `start_action = trap` installs the kernel policy at load time and negotiates on the first matching packet. Traffic between the hosts never goes out in plaintext, even before the tunnel is up.
-   `dpd_delay` and `dpd_action` detect a dead peer and re-arm the trap so the tunnel comes back when the peer does.

The secret file permissions matter. Restrict the file to root:

```bash
sudo chmod 600 /etc/swanctl/conf.d/server-b.conf
```

### Step 5: Configure server-b

Create `/etc/swanctl/conf.d/server-a.conf` on `server-b`. It's the same file with the addresses swapped:

```
connections {
    server-a {
        version = 2
        local_addrs = 198.51.100.20
        remote_addrs = 203.0.113.10
        proposals = aes256gcm16-prfsha384-ecp384
        dpd_delay = 30s

        local {
            auth = psk
            id = 198.51.100.20
        }
        remote {
            auth = psk
            id = 203.0.113.10
        }
        children {
            server-a {
                mode = transport
                esp_proposals = aes256gcm16-ecp384
                start_action = trap
                dpd_action = trap
            }
        }
    }
}

secrets {
    ike-server-a {
        id = 203.0.113.10
        secret = "PASTE_THE_KEY_FROM_STEP_3"
    }
}
```

### Step 6: Load the config and bring up the tunnel

On both servers, start the daemon and load the config:

```bash
sudo systemctl enable --now strongswan
sudo swanctl --load-all
```

Because of `start_action = trap`, the tunnel comes up on the first packet. Send one from `server-a`:

```bash
ping -c 3 198.51.100.20
```

The first ping can be lost while IKE negotiates. To bring the tunnel up explicitly instead, run `sudo swanctl --initiate --child server-b`.

### Step 7: Verify the traffic is encrypted

List the active SAs:

```bash
sudo swanctl --list-sas
```

Look for an IKE SA in state `ESTABLISHED` and a CHILD SA in state `INSTALLED` with mode `TRANSPORT`. The kernel's view is available with `ip xfrm state` and `ip xfrm policy`.

Then confirm what's on the wire. On `server-a`, capture traffic to the peer while the ping runs:

```bash
sudo tcpdump -ni any host 198.51.100.20
```

Apart from the IKE exchange on UDP 500 and 4500, every packet should show as `ESP(spi=...,seq=...)`, or as UDP on port 4500 if NAT is in the path. If you see ICMP echo requests in the clear, the policy isn't applied.

### Site-to-site: switching to tunnel mode

When each server is a gateway for a private network behind it, switch the CHILD SA to tunnel mode and name the subnets. On `server-a`, with `10.10.0.0/16` behind it and `10.20.0.0/16` behind `server-b`:

```
children {
    server-b {
        mode = tunnel
        local_ts = 10.10.0.0/16
        remote_ts = 10.20.0.0/16
        esp_proposals = aes256gcm16-ecp384
        start_action = trap
        dpd_action = trap
    }
}
```

`server-b` gets the mirror image, with `local_ts` and `remote_ts` swapped. Both gateways need IP forwarding on (`sysctl -w net.ipv4.ip_forward=1`), and hosts on each subnet need a route to the remote subnet through their local gateway.

### Troubleshooting

Start with the logs. `journalctl -u strongswan -f` shows the daemon's view, and `swanctl --log` streams IKE events live.

| Symptom | Likely cause | Fix |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN` | The two sides offer no common algorithm set | Make `proposals` and `esp_proposals` identical on both servers |
| `AUTHENTICATION_FAILED` | PSK mismatch, or the `id` values don't match what the peer presents | Compare the secret byte for byte and check each `id` against the peer's `local.id` |
| IKE establishes but no traffic passes | ESP (protocol 50) blocked by a firewall or security group | Allow ESP, or add `encap = yes` to the connection to force UDP 4500 |
| Small requests work, large transfers stall | ESP overhead pushes packets past the path MTU | Lower the interface MTU or clamp TCP MSS on the affected path |
| Tunnel never comes up from one side | Policy loaded on one server only | Run `swanctl --load-all` on both and confirm with `swanctl --list-conns` |

### Scaling past two servers

Everything above is per pair. A full mesh of `n` servers needs `n(n-1)/2` tunnels: 45 for ten servers, 1,225 for fifty. Every new server means a config change on every existing one, plus new firewall rules on both ends of each link.

Credentials scale the same way. One PSK per pair gets unmanageable fast, so larger deployments move to certificates. You run a private CA (strongSwan's `pki` tool can issue them), give each host its own certificate and switch to `auth = pubkey`. That removes per-pair secrets, but adds certificate issuance, renewal and revocation to the job.

strongSwan rekeys the session keys on its own, every hour for CHILD SAs and every four hours for the IKE SA by default. Everything else is yours: the tunnel inventory, the long-term credentials, the firewall rules, the MTU tuning and the route changes when a private link becomes available between two hosts. That operational surface is what [Cycle's control plane](https://cycle.io/platform/networking) takes off your plate.

---

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